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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 
26(2)(a) of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Sections 77-
1-6(g) and 78-2a-3(2)(f) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended; and Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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SIHIhnkh-T DF ISSUES PRESENTED OH RPPERL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REUIEU 
1. Did the trial court incorrectly conclude that 
Pierce, the lawful possessor of vehicle, waived his 
standing to contest the seizure of the marijuana found in 
the trunk as the result of his illegal detention? 
Utah case law is clear that "a driver who has 
permission to use a vehicle and has personal belongings in 
the car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car 
and its contents." State v. Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 916 
(Utah flpp. 1992). Whether defendant has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy i3 reviewed "under a correction of 
error standard, affording no deference to the trial court." 
State v. Kolster, 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah App. 1994) citing 
State v. Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah Rpp. 1992). 
2. Did the trial court incorrectly conclude that 
Pierce abandoned his expectation of privacy in the 
marijuana in the trunk by his statement that the only thing 
that was his was the backpack given the fact the the 
statement was made in response to a question about the 
contents of the back seat and at the scene he acknowledged 
possession of the marijuana? 
A. A statement claiming ownership of one item 
in one area of a vehicle does not constitute abandonment of 
expectation of privacy In rest of vehicle and its contents. 
A mere disclaimer of property interest in insufficient to 
establish abandonment. State v Rowe. 806 P.2d 730,746 (Utah 
1 
flpp. 1991, rev'd on other ground^; 850 P.2d 42? (Utah 
1992). 
B. Intent to abandon is viewed from defendant's 
state of mind and is a question of intent to voluntarily 
relinquish a reasonable expectation of priuacy, which may 
be inferred from "uiords spoken, acts done, and other 
objective facts". State v. Rome. 806 P.2d 730, 736. 
C. The burden of proving abandonment falls on 
the state, and must be shown by "clear, unequivocal and 
decisive evidence". State v. Rome, 806 P.2d at 736. 
D. fl trial court's conclusion as to whether 
defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy is 
reviewed under a correctness standard, affording no 
deference. State v. Kolster. 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah Rpp. 
1994); State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah flpp. 
1992). 
DETERH1HRTIUE CONSTITUTIONAL PRQUISIONS. STRTUTES. RULES 
Texts set forth in the addendum. 
For location in brief please see table of contents. 
STRTEHEHT OF CRSE 
fl. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order denying Pierce's 
motion to suppress. The case involves a) a traffic stop 
and a charge of Speeding, a Clas3 C Misdemeanor, in 
violation of § 41-6-46, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, and b) a vehicle search and seizure of marijuana 
resulting in charges of Possession of Controlled Substance 
2 
mini IIILCIIL LU uisiriDuie, a inira Degree felony, in 
violation of § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended and Failure to Comply with the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Tax, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of § 59—19— 
103, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended (Record 1-2). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On April 21, 1994 a preliminary hearing was held and 
Pierce was bound over on all counts (A. 11-12). On July 
29, 1994, Pierce filed a Hot ion to Suppress and Memorandum 
in Support (R. 23-38). On August 3, 1994, prosecutor Halls 
filed a Hemorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress (R. 
67-77). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
On August 5, 1994, a suppression hearing was was held 
in Seventh District Court with the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson presiding (Transcript 1-73). Said motion was 
denied, although trial court found that trooper Eldredge 
did not have reasonable suspicion for continued detention 
and exceeded scope of traffic stop by detaining and 
questioning about contraband and requesting consent to 
search and 3aid consent was not attenuated from that 
illegality and therefore invalid (R. 81-84). But Court 
ruled that before any illegality Pierce narrowed his 
expectation of priuacy in the rest of the vehicle and 
specifically the marijuana in the trunk by his statement 
that the only thing that was his was the backpack and that 
he said that intending to make the officer believe that the 
3 
DacKpacK was oniy m i n g in m e venicie m a i uias nis u . n -
72; R. 81-84). Judge Anderson found that statement to be 
an abandonment of expectation of privacy and that it mas 
reasonable for the officer to rely on that abandonment (T. 
73; R. 84). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order Denying Hot ion to Suppress were filed on August 16, 
1994 (R. 80-84). 
Pursuant to State v, Serif and Rule 11(i), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, Pierce entered a conditional guilty 
plea, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress, (T. 74-94) to Possession of Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute and Failure to Comply 
with the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax (T. 87-88). Pierce entered 
a straight guilty plea to Speeding (T. 88). Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order re Conditional Plea 
were entered on October 11, 1994 (R. 85-86). 
On October 20, 1994, Pierce was sentenced to serve a 
term not to exceed five years in prison and pay fees and 
fines in the amount of $1,850,00; the prison term was 
suspended on condition he serve 60 days in the San Juan 
County Jail and pay the fees and fines (R. 87-88). On 
November 28, 1994, Pierce filed an Application for 
Certificate of Probable Cause with Memorandum in Support 
arguing that the issues on appeal raised substantial 
questions of law and fact which are novel or fairly 
debatable and integral to the dispositive ruling (R. 89-
97). On the December 5, 1994, the Certificate of Probable 
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Cause, staying the judgment pending th i s appeal,, was 
entered by the trial court (R. 100-101). 
D. Facts 
On February 17, 1994, Trooper Rick El dredge 
(Eldredge), working in San Juan County, Utah on State Road 
191, observed and stopped a vehicle for speeding (T. 6-7). 
The driuer, identified as defendant Daryl Pierce (Pierce) 
was the sole occupant of the vehicle (T. 7). Eldredge 
informed Pierce that he was stopped because of his speed; 
Pierce acknowledged going a little fast (T. 7, 32). Pierce 
produced his driver's license and a traveler's agreement 
from an auto drive-away company (T. 7, 9). The agreement 
Ii3ted Pierce as the authorized traveler (driuer) of the 
vehicle, however, Eldredge initially "skimmed over it" (T. 
9, 21-22). The agreement stated Pierce's route and that he 
was authorized to travel on Interstate 70 and local roads 
as needed (T.22, 28, 36). It also stated the driver wa3 to 
call owner the day before delivery to make appropriate 
delivery arrangements (T. 36-37). The agreement also 
listed the UIN number of the vehicle which matched the 
vehicle stopped by Eldredge (T. 22). During this first 
portion of the stop, Eldredge observed luggage and golf 
clubs in the back seat and asked Pierce whose belongings 
were in the back seat (T. 7-8). Pierce replied that 
luggage and golf clubs were the owner's and the only thing 
that was his was the backpack (T. 8). 
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El dredge also asked Pierce where he was going (T. 7). 
There is a dispute about what the officer was told about 
Pierce's travel plans: Eldredge alleges that Pierce stated 
one reason for travel and then contradicted himself while 
Pierce testified he did not give conflicting stories (T. 7, 
10, 32-33). Pierce knew the vehicle owner's name, but 
stated that he was told to take the vehicle to someone else 
and did not have that name handy (T. 9, 33). Eldredge felt 
that the story was peculiar, the travel route wa3 strange 
and Pierce was nervous (T. 10-11). 
Eldredge and Pierce then went back to his patrol 
vehicle for the issuance of a speeding citation and 
investigative questioning (T. 11-12, 26). While in the 
process of writing the citation, as Eldredge was suspicious 
about Pierce (although suspicions did not rise to the level 
of reasonable suspicion (T. 6?)) he asked Pierce if he had 
any weapons or controlled substances in the vehicle and he 
replied no (T. 11-12). The uncompleted ticket, along with 
Pierce's license and paperwork, was put aside and not 
completed until Pierce was booked at the county jail (T. 
12, 16, 19, 25). Pierce was asked to consent to a vehicle 
search, told he had to sign form before Eldredge could 
search and he then signed a consent form (T.12-15). 
Eldredge began a search of the vehicle, in the front 
passenger side of the car and worked his way to the back 
seat; no contraband was found in the passenger area (T. 
16). He then popped the trunk and found more luggage, 
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including two closed duffel bag3 (T, 16), He opened one of 
the duffel bags and found what appeared to him to be and 
was later confirmed as a controlled substance (T. 16). He 
asked what it contained and Pierce answered marijuana (T. 
17). Pierce later stated that the luggage was the owner's 
and the marijuana was his (T. 17). Pierce was placed under 
arrest for possession of controlled substance with the 
intent to distribute and booked into the San Juan County 
Jail (T. 17). 
SUMMRRV DF RRGUflEHT 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Pierce, the 
lawful possessor of the vehicle, waived his standing to 
contest the seizure of the marijuana found in the vehicle's 
trunk as the result of his illegal detention. Rs the 
lawful user of the vehicle, Pierce had "a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its contents and" 
had "standing to challenge the admission of evidence 
seized" during an unlawful search. State v. tlatison. 875 
P.2d 584, 239 Utah Rdv. Rep. 19, 22 (Utah flpp. 1994). 
The trial court erred in ruling that Pierce abandoned 
any expectation of privacy in the marijuana in the trunk by 
his statement that the only thing that was his was the 
backpack despite the fact that the statement was made in 
response to a question about the contents of the back seat 
and he acknowledged possession of the marijuana at the 
scene. 
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Pierce's statement did not constitute a waiver of his 
privacy interest in the vehicle and it3 contents; even a 
disclaimer of interest is insufficient to establish 
abandonment. The trial court erred in using the officer's 
state of mind rather than the defendant's in determining 
abandonment and not looking objectively at the words used 
and the factual situation. The trial judge also erred in 
not requiring the prosecutor to meet his burden of 
establishing abandonment which must be shown by "clear, 
unequivocal and decisive evidence". State v. Rome. 806 
P.2d 730, 736 (Utah flpp. 1991, rev'd on other grounds); 850 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). Standing and expectation of privacy 
conclusions are reviewed under a correctness standard and 
under that standard the trial court's conclusions were 
incorrect as was his denial of the motion to suppress. 
ARGUMENT 
There is no case law or legal authority for the trial 
court'3 ruling that a statement referring to one item in 
one part of a vehicle can serve as an abandonment of a 
legitimate privacy interest in the rest of the vehicle and 
contents. However, a disclaimer of interest has been held 
by many courts and legal authorities to be insufficient to 
constitute abandonment. fls the issue of whether the 
statement about one area can equal abandonment of the rest 
of vehicle is a novel issue and what factually constitutes 
abandonment is a fairly unclear area in Utah case law, the 
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most pertinent analysis, the direct disclaimer analysis 
will be used. 
I. Standing 
fls a preliminary matter, there is no question that 
Pierce has standing to object to the search and seizure of 
his person and that of the vehicle he lawfully possessed. 
"Although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
car than in his or her home, one does not lose the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile." 
State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). Utah 
case I QUI is clear that "a driver who has permission to use 
a vehicle and has personal belongings in the car has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and its 
contents." State v. Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 
fipp. 1992). fl lawful possessor has "a reasonable 
expectation of privacy In the vehicle and its contents and, 
unless waived, has standing to challenge the admission of 
evidence seized during the search." State v. flatison. 875 
P.2d 584; 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 22 (Utah App. 1994). 
Whether defendant ha3 a legitimate expectation of 
privacy is reviewed "under a correction of error standard, 
affording no deference to the trial court." State v. 
Kolster. 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah App. 1994) citing State v. 
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah App. 1992). 
fis authorized possessor of a vehicle illegally 
detained by an officer, Pierce has standing to contest the 
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seizure of the marijuana found in the trunk as the result 
of his illegal detention. Trial court noted "if defendant 
has standing then this is going to be suppressed" because 
"the illegality of detaining to ask for consent is itself 
not sufficiently attenuative (3ic) from the voluntary 
consent to make the consent valid" (T. 70-71). fls Pierce 
did not abandon or waive his privacy interest he had 
standing to object to the search and the motion to suppress 
should have been granted due to his illegal detention. 
Trial court correctly acknowledged the case lam giving 
Pierce an expectation of privacy and standing in the 
vehicle and its contents; however he incorrectly held that 
Pierce had decreased that expectation by his backpack 
comment. Trial court noted: 
general statements in the cases that if someone 
has exhibited the right to have the vehicle 
and control the vehicle, he has an expectation 
of privacy in the vehicle or everything in it. 
find that would ordinarily apply here, but in 
this case, we have the additional factor that 
that mas narrowed down by the defendant's own 
statements. He made a statement Intending the 
officer to understand, and the officer did, in 
fact, understand that the only thing in this 
vehicle which belonged to someone else, which he 
would have a brief period of time, was his back-
pack, find I find from that -- I'm looking — I 
think the proper way to examine that question 
from the standpoint of what the officer — I 
can't expect the officer to predict what will 
happen after that. 
10 
(T. 71). The court erred in finding that the statement 
constituted abandonment and analyzing the issue from the 
officer's point of view. 
2. Abandonment. 
fl statement referring to one item in one part of a 
vehicle is insufficient to establish the abandonment of 
privacy expectation in remainder of vehicle and contents, 
fi mere disclaimer of ownership does not constitute 
abandonment. Abandonment must be shown by clear, 
unambiguous facts viewed from the defendant's state of 
mind. Prosecution has the burden of proving abandonment 
and they failed to do so in this case. 
fl. fl Mere Disclaimer of Property Interest 
is Insufficient to Prove Abandonment. 
Many courts and legal authorities have held that it 
takes more than a denial or disclaimer of interest in 
questioned property to establish abandonment. 
"Abandonment must be distinguished from a mere 
disclaimer of a property interest made to the police prior 
to the search, which under the better view does not defeat 
standing." 4 Li, LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.3(a) at 
287 (2d ed. 1987). Illustrative is Commonwealth v. 
Sandler. 368 floss. 729, 335 N.E.2d 903 (1975). Police 
questioned property owner Drew about location which they 
11 
believed contained stolen property. Drew referred them to 
renter Sandler who 
denied renting the premises or storing any 
property there, after which the police searched 
those premises with the consent of Drew, The 
court quite correctly ruled that Sandler had 
standing to question the search, for it can hardly 
be said that Fourth Amendment rights evaporate 
merely because of a failure to make incriminating 
admissions in response to police inquiries. The 
disclaimer, therefore, does not defeat defendant's 
standing. 
1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.3(a) at 287-88 (2d 
ed. 1987). 
This court has also applied the "better rule" that a 
mere disclaimer or an ambiguous disclaimer does not 
constitute abandonment. See State v. Rome. 806 P.2d 730, 
736 (Utah App. 1991, rev'd an other grounds) \ 850 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1992) (The Supreme Court held that the search warrant 
violation did not require exclusion of evidence and 
therefore did not address the Court of Appeals ruling on 
abandonment); 3ee also State v. Marshal 1. 791 P.2d 880, 132 
Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 
(Utah 1990). 
Rowe involved an invited guest at a home where a no-
knock nighttime search warrant was executed. Officers 
secured the house and gave her permission to leave but 
since she was not wearing shoes an officer accompanied her 
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to the bedroom where she retrieved them from a pile of 
items. State v. Rome. 806 P.2d 730, 731. 
The officer then asked her if she had everything that 
was hers and she replied that she did. She left, the house 
was searched and drugs were found. Specifically, a purse 
was found in the bedroom pile that contained a vial of 
methamphetamine and documents belonging to Rowe. Later at 
the police department she admitted ownership of the drugs 
and purse. The state argued that Rowe abandoned any 
expectation of privacy when she told the officer she had 
everything that was hers. State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d at 732. 
In deciding whether Rowe had abandoned her expectation 
of privacy, the court relied upon the "better view" that a 
mere disclaimer does not defeat standing. 806 P.2d at 736 
citing *t U. LaFave, Search and Se/zare, § 11.3(a) at 287 
(2d ed. 1987). The court found that abandonment had not 
been proven by that state, but it did not determine whether 
Rowe's response constituted abandonment. 806 P.2d at 737. 
The court held that Rowe's "repudiation of interest in 
property located in the bedroom is consistent with a 
conclusion of abandonment. It is not, however, 
inconsistent with a conclusion of a mere disclaimer of 
interest to avoid self-incrimination." 806 P.2d at 736. 
Rowe specifically said she had all her possessions and 
she left the items under police control whereas Pierce made 
a statement about one area of vehicle and never physically 
abandoned the items. Using the above analysis, Pierce 
13 
should be found to not have abandoned his privacy 
expectation in the trunk contents. 
Marshall involved a traffic stop inhere Marshal I's 
rental car trunk was opened, he mas asked what was in the 
suitcase found there, initially replied "clothes" and then 
said "the suitcases were not his and must have already been 
in the trunk when he rented the vehicle". State v. 
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880; 132 Utah fidv. Rep. 45, 46 (Utah 
flpp.) cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). The court 
characterized the above statement as an "ambiguous 
disclaimer of ownership". Marshall. 791 P.2d 880; 132 Utah 
fidv. Rep. at 50. The case was remanded for determination 
of whether defendant had abandoned his privacy interest and 
the nexus between the police illegality and his 
abandonment, if any, of expectation of privacy. 
The Marshal! court cited several federal cases where 
abandonment was found when defendant specifically 
physically or verbally abandoned or disclaimed the actual 
item seized, i.e., defendant initially seen with an item 
and when stopped didn't have item and denied knowledge of 
it; defendant denied ownership of item located next to him; 
or defendant disclaimed ownership of the item and walked 
away. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880; 132 Utah fidv. Rep.at 52, n. 
11 (citations omitted). Given the characterization of 
Marshall's disclaimer as ambiguous and the factual 
situations that generally constitute abandonment, Pierce's 
statement clearly does not constitute an abandonment as it 
14 
is ambiguous and not a direct specific denial of ownership. 
Pierce's backpack statement i3 much more akin to a mere 
disclaimer than an unambiguous abandonment. 
Pierce's failure to volunteer information about the 
presence of controlled substance before it mas discovered 
(answering in negative when first questioned about 
contraband) is a patent example of a permissible exercise 
of his right to avoid self-incrimination Like an 
ambiguous disclaimer, a failure to make an inculpatory 
statement is insufficient to show abandonment. "To equate a 
passive failure to claim potentially incriminating evidence 
with an affirmative abandonment of property mould be to 
twist both logic and experience in a most uncomfortable 
knot." State v. Jouner. 66 Hawaii 543, 669 P.2d 152 (1983). 
See /sas, infra, for further Fifth Amendment analysis. 
In State v. Isom. the tlontana Supreme Court found that 
despite a state statute that a search could not be held 
illegal if defendant disclaimed interest in place or object 
searched or things seized and a despite a denial of 
ownership of the vehicle by Isom, he had standing to 
contest search of bags containing marijuana in the trunk of 
the car. 196 ttont. 330, 641 P.2d 417, 422 (1982). Court 
held that a mere disclaimer should not give rise to 
abandonment. 
Given the position that a defendant does 
not otherwise have to incriminate himself to 
preserve his Fourth Amendment rights, . . . 
15 
it is difficult to understand how a refusal to 
make incriminating admissions in response to 
police interrogation can be held to deprive a 
person of Fourth Amendment standing. 
Isorn. 641 P,2d at 422, citing Simmons v, United States 
(1968) 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247. The 
court using a Rwanda or Fifth Amendment analysis, stated 
that "(c)learly, the Riranda I imitations should apply to 
disclaimers when the State U3es them to deprive a person of 
Fourth Amendment standing." Isorn. 641 P.2d 422. 
The Court then looked at defendant's privacy 
expectation in the specific area searched and held that 
regardless of the Fifth Amendment limitations on the state 
statute and even 
assuming that the disclaimer could be construed 
to deprive the defendant of standing to contest 
the search of the car, In light of Robblns v. 
California (1981), 453 U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 
69 L.Ed.2d 744, the disclaimer could not be con-
strued to deprive the defendant of standing to 
contest the search of the garbage bags found in 
the trunk of the car. 
In Rabbin^Wte Court held that while police 
may have conducted a lawful search of an auto-
mobile under the automobile exception, they must 
nevertheless secure a warrant for any container 
found in the trunk of the car. The Court recog-
nized that the expectation of privacy in a closed 
container taken from a car is not necessarily less 
than the privacy expectation in closed pieces of 
luggage found elsewhere. 
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said that the defendant lost his expectation of 
privacy in the opaque garbage bags when he dis-
claimed ownership of the car. While it is argu-
able that the disclaimer weakened the defendant's 
expectation of privacy In the car, it cannot be 
said to have affected his expectation of privacy 
in the garbage bags. The disclaimer, therefore, 
in no way affected defendant's standing to contest 
the search of the garbage bags, 
641 P,2d at 422-23, 
The Fifth Amendment analysis clearly applies to the 
answers to questioning about contraband as Pierce at that 
time mas clearly not free to go, however it should also 
apply to the backpack comment as at that time Pierce was 
also not iree to go, as officer had not given him a 
citat ion yet, 
HI so the closed container analysis is applicable in 
this case and Pierce should be found to have standing to 
contest the search of the duffel bag in the trunk 
containing marijuana, Pierce's case is even clearer as he 
never made a denial of knowledge about the vehicle as Isom 
did, in fact, he never made any denial of possession of the 
vehicle or any contents except the owner's luggage. 
In State v. Huether. the North Dakota Supreme Court 
held that a post search disclaimer did not constitute 
abandonment. 453 N,U.2d 778 (H.D. 1990). Huether was 
stopped for speeding, officer detected alcohol, obtained 
consent to search for open containers, and opened a small 
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bag partially under the front seat. Huether 3aid it 
contained garbage, however it ma3 opened and found to 
contain controlled substance and Huether then denied 
ownership and knowledge of bag and contents. 153 N.U.2d at 
780. 
The state argued, as the state and court reasoned in 
the present case, that by saying "'the bag wasn't his and 
he didn't know what was inside,' he lost any expectation of 
privacy in the bag." 453 H.U.2d at 780. The trial court 
ruled that Huether's denial of ownership, by itself, was 
not a waiver of Huether's reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the bag. id The Horth Dakota Supreme Court noted that 
an examination of how defendant treated the article is 
needed, as a disclaimer: 
is "not necessarily the hallmark for deciding 
the substance of a fourth amendment claim." 
In the same way that ownership alone may not 
be sufficient to confer or retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, . . . disavowal of 
ownership alone may not be enough to relinquish 
one's reasonable expectation of privacy. This 
is especially true where, as here, the paper 
bag is contained and controlled within an areo 
where there is a legitimate expectation of 
privacy. Huether did not discard or place the 
bag in a pub Iic place. 
453 H.N.2d at 781 (citations omitted). 
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After reviewing the location from which the container 
with the contraband was seized and the container itself, 
the court held: 
There Is little doubt that Huether had 
an expectation of privacy in his vehicle and 
in every container therein that concealed its 
contents from plain view, There is no consti-
tutional distinction between paper bags and 
others kinds of containers. Furthermore, where 
the disclaimer comes only after the search of 
the disclaimed article reveals contraband, the 
disclaimer, made In an effort to avoid making 
an incriminating statement, should not alone 
be deemed to constitute abandonment. 
Id. at 781 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, Pierce should be determined to have an 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle and the containers 
(duffel bags) whose contents were not in plain view. His 
bag was also in an vehicle where he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy. His statements also should be 
found to be insufficient to establish abandonment. 
fl statement alone is not determinative; court should 
look objectively at situation and what actually was said 
and done. In a similar fact situation to the present case: 
accused narcotics offenders were held not to 
have abandoned a bag containing heroin which 
was found In the car they had been driving, 
even though they had denied ownership of the 
bag when approached and questioned by police 
in People v. Cameron (1973) 73 nisc.2d 790, 342 
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HYS2d 773, where the court pointed out that the 
accused had not denied possession of the bag 
and ruled that mere denial of ownership mas not 
proof of an intent to abandon, The bag had not 
been thrown from the car, the court observed, 
but had remained under the seat while the ac-
cused were stopped and questioned by the police. 
There is a great deal of difference, the court 
stated, between denial of ownership of property 
on a public street where no possession is 
claimed or indicated and denial of ownership of 
property in a car where possession is conceded. 
40 flLR 4th Search and Seizure—Abandoned Property % 22 In 
Uehicle at 431-35. 
B~Under a Factual Analysis Pierce Had No Intent 
To Relinquish His Expectation of Privacy 
"Abandonment is primarily a factual question of intent 
to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, which may be inferred from 'words spoken, acts 
done, and other objective facts'." Rome. 806 P.2d at 736 
(citation omitted). "Abandonment 'is measured from the 
vantage point' of the defendant, not the police. 'It is 
only the [defendant's] state of mind that counts.'" 806 
P.2d at 736 (citation omitted). "Ue determine whether 
defendants have an expectation of privacy from their point 
of view. . . . [U]e look to how defendants manifest their 
expectations regarding the object searched to determine 
their subjective privacy interest." State v. Kol3ter. 869 
P.2d 993 (Utah App. 1994). 
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The words used by both Pierce and El dredge show no 
intent to abandon or understanding of abandonment of 
Pierce'3 expectation of privacy in the trunk contents. The 
officer acknowledged he questioned Pierce specifically 
about the contents of the back seat (T. 8, 23). 
Objectively a reasonable individual questioned about the 
back seat mould answer about the back seat only as Pierce 
answered. Looking at the "words spoken", Pierce did not 
say "the only thing in the entire car that is mine is the 
backpack" or "the only thing in the car that is mine is the 
backpack", rather referring to the contents of back seat he 
3aid "those are the owner's, only thing that is mine is the 
backpack" (T. 8). 
Also at the scene before the packages of marijuana 
were opened, Pierce admitted the bags contained marijuana 
and soon thereafter admitted it belonged to him (T. 17). 
Pierce's actions are inconsistent with an intent to 
abandon. 
It is important to note Eldredge did not treat the 
backpack statement as an abandonment of any priuacy 
interest in the rest of the vehicle. "Uhat an officer knew 
or believed is part of our legitimate expectation of 
privacy analysis only when a defendant has asserted to that 
officer a permissive or possessory interest in the object 
searched." Kolster. 869 P.2d 993, 995. That standard is 
applicable in the present situation. After the backpack 
comment, Eldredge questioned Pierce further about the 
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vehicle's contents and requested consent to search the 
vehicle (T. 12-15). fls the vehicle uia3 owned by another 
individual, if officer felt Pierce had no other items in 
the vehicle then, he should have tried to contact the omner 
to obtain permission to search. Obviously, a person mho 
has abandoned any interest in the vehicle and its contents 
is not the appropriate person to ask to consent to a 
search, in fact abandoned property does not require consent 
to search. 
Based on El dredge's request for consent he obviously 
did not treat the backpack comment as an abandonment of 
Pierce's further interest in the vehicle and its contents. 
El dredge acted as if Pierce had privacy interest. fin 
officer's similar reaction has been held to defeat a claim 
of abandonment: 
[Gjarment bag illegally seized from defen-
dant's railroad sleeping car was not abandoned, 
even though defendant, when questioned by 
federal agents as to ownership, replied "Uell, 
it's yours now," where agents gave defendant 
receipt for it, and waited for dog sniff to 
establish probable cause instead of treating it 
as abandoned property and opening it right away. 
United States v. Diraick (1992, DC Colo) 790 
F.Supp. 1543. 
40 fiLR 4th, Search andSeizure—Abandoned Proper>tt/t § 22.5 
Conveyances other than cars or trucks, supp. at 36. 
That the "abandonment" in the case at bar was not 
based on the requisite clear, unequivocal decisive evidence 
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was acknowledged by the trial court when asked by defense 
counsel about factual issues that indicated there was no 
abandonment. 
Miss Starley: On the standing Issue, the 
officer testified that he questioned him about 
what mas in the back seat, and that's when he 
made the statement that only the backpack was 
his, and that when he was asked about the mari-
juana, he did say that was his. That was what 
was presented to the officer at that time. 
The Court: I'm aware of that, Hiss 
Starley, and I realize that that nay undercut 
the conclusion that I arrived at here, But, 
I'm basing my conclusion on the fact that this 
is a situation where the defendant, from the 
very beginning, distanced himself from this 
vehicle as having any responsibility for what 
was in it. find, with regard to the only things 
that were apparent in it, he said, "the only 
thing that is mine is the backpack," Now, I 
realize that could have been interpreted 08 
meaning the only thing that's in the back seat 
is my backpack. But, I find that what the de-
fendant intended to convey was the only things 
in the car that's mine is the backpack, and 
everything else in the car is the owner's, find, 
I agree that there's some ambiguity there in 
regard to what's in the trunk, because that was 
not specifically visible. But, I find specific-
ally that the defendant did say, "The only thing 
that's mine is the backpack," He didn't say, 
"The only thing in the back seat that's mine is 
the backpack," He said, "The only thing that's 
mine is the backpack", meaning and understood to 
be the only thing in the car. 
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(T. 72-73). 
The trial court's conclusion that Pierce had distanced 
himself from the vehicle is not supported by the objective 
facts: he showed El dredge proof that he mas the lawful 
possessor, answered questions about its contents, signed a 
consent to search and claimed the marijuana found therein. 
Given his possession through a drive-away agreement he had 
many opportunities to distance himself but he did not do 
so. Again, he could have said "that backpack is only thing 
in this car that's mine" or "I don't know about anything in 
the car except my backpack" or when questioned about 
consent "Don't ask me, nothing in the car is mine". Also 
as noted above, the trial court's ruling that Eldredge 
understood Pierce to have abandoned his privacy interest is 
not supported by the objective facts, in particular, 
Eldredge did not treat the property as abandoned, instead 
he asked for consent and even told Pierce that he could 
not search unless Pierce signed the consent form (T. 12-
15). 
Obviously Pierce's statement about the back seat 
contents is nothing like the standard abandonment situation 
where item is physically discarded, see Marshall discussion 
supra, and Rust In discussion Infra "One of the most 
common situations in which abandonment is claimed by the 
prosecution, and often sustained by the courts, is where an 
accused criminal had allegedly dropped, thrown away, or 
otherwise discarded some incriminating item, such as 
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narcotics, during an encounter with the police or other law 
enforcement agents." 40 flLR 4th, Search and Seizure— 
Abandoned Property § 2 Summary and Comment at 389. 
In State v. Austin. Utah Supreme court held that 
Austin lost his expectation of privacy in items found 
partially burned in a wastebasket as items mere in plain 
view and 
a privacy expectation is based on a subjective 
intent that the person has an Interest in the 
property. Once that property Is thrown away, 
however, no valid interest remains, fl waste-
basket carries an inference that anything put 
into it is intended to be discarded or destroy-
ed. It i3 not the same privacy interest that 
exists in a drawer or in a foot locker as was 
found in the Chadtnick case•" 
Rust In. 584 P.2d 853, 857 (Utah 1978). Chadxick dealt with 
warrantless searches during arrests and "held that evidence 
should be suppressed because it was taken from a foot locker 
in which the defendant had a privacy interest". 584 P.2d at 
655, citing U.S. v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 
L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). 
The present case involves a closed container, whose 
contents were hidden from view, in the trunk of car, an 
area where Pierce had and kept a privacy interest, like the 
foot locker in Chadwick rather than the wastebasket in 
ftustin. The lawful possessor of vehicle has an expectation 
of privacy in all closed containers in the vehicle which 
is recognized as reasonable by society, be it a paperbag as 
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in ttuatner, garbage bag in /acta, foot locker in Cbadxr/ck or 
a bag in Carnation. Pierce maintained his expectation of 
privacy a3 did defendants in those cases. Here as in 
Cameron, the bag 3tayed in the car, concealed from view 
while defendant was stopped and questioned. It i3 important 
to note: "[t]here is a great deal of difference, between 
denial of ownership of property on a public street where no 
possession is claimed or indicated and denial of ownership 
of property in a car where possession is conceded. 40 flLR 
4th, Search and Seizure—Abandoned Property § 22 In 
Uehicle at 434-35 citing Caaeran. 
C—The State Failed to Prove Abandonment 
"The burden of proving abandonment falls on the state, 
and must be shown by 'clear, unequivocal and decisive 
evidence'." Rowe. 806 P.2d at 736 (citations omitted). 
The 3tate has not met their burden as they are relying 
solely on an ambiguous, equivocal statement as the trial 
court acknowledged supra R statement about one area and 
one item not the entire vehicle contents, fl statement made 
in a context which showed an intent to maintain an 
expectation of privacy. 
In reviewing all available legal sources, there were 
no cases found where a statement claiming ownership of one 
item in a vehicle was held to be a disclaimer of interest 
in the rest of the vehicle and its contents. However given 
the number of cases where a direct denial of ownership in 
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the specific container in question or area enclosing the 
container ha3 been held to not establish abandonment, it is 
difficult to see how Pierce's statement could do so, 
fl3 3een from the examination of the relevant case law, 
it takes a very unambiguous disclaimer to support a claim 
of abandonment: Marshall's initial statement that the 
suitcases had clothes and his subsequent statements that 
the cases were not his and must have already been in 
vehicle were categorized an "ambiguous disclaimer of 
ownership". 132 Utah fldv. Rep. 45, 50. Rowe's statement 
that she had removed everything from the room and her 
leaving her purse in the house with police was held to be 
insufficient to meet state's burden of proof to establish 
abandonment. 806 P.2d 730,736-37. Huether's disclaimer of 
ownership of bag in car was held insufficient as mas l3om's 
denial of ownership of car where contraband was found. 611 
P.2d 417, 422-23. 
fls noted supra, an objective analysis of the facts 
involved shows that abandonment wa3 not intended by 
Pierce's comment and was not treated as abandonment by 
Eldredge. Pierce's statement is not sufficient to show an 
intent to abandon the expectation of privacy in the vehicle 
and its contents he had as the lawful possessor of the 
vehicle. 
Pierce was only answering the question asked which 
referred to the contents of the back seat (T. 7-8). 
Officer acknowledged the question was in reference to 
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contents of the back seat (T. 8, 23). There is no showing 
that he intended to disclaim ownership of the rest of the 
contents of the vehicle, flfter the backpack statement,the 
officer asked Pierce to consent to a search and he signed a 
consent form (T. 12-15). Even using the trial court's 
flawed analysis of the officer's state of mind at the 
scene, Eldredge treated Pierce as having a privacy 
interest by requesting consent and not treating the rest of 
the uehicle and contents as abandoned or belonging to 
another. He even told Pierce hat he could not search 
without Pierce's consent (T. 12-15). 
More importantly, Pierce continued to express a 
privacy interest by signing the form and while he did not 
claim knowledge of contraband in general when first asked 
(a mere disclaimer to avoid self-incrimination) he did not 
say none of its mine or you'll have to contact the owner. 
Again., he also claimed ownership of the marijuana at the 
scene, as opposed to the usual situation where the suspect 
denies any knowledge at the scene and only claims ownership 
to prove standing at the suppression hearing. 
Under the proper abandonment analysis, there is no 
showing that Pierce intended to abandon his expectation of 
privacy in the trunk contents. The state has failed to 
meet its burden of proof. 
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D. Abandonment is Reviewed Under 
Correctness Standard. 
Judge's finderson legal conclusion that Pierce 
abandoned his expectation of privacy is reviewed "under a 
'correctness* standard." State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 
914 (Utah flpp. 1992), citing State v. Looez. 831 P.2d 1040, 
1043 (Utah flpp. 1992), Standing is reviewed under a 
correctness standard, fls noted in Sepulvedat "me review 
the trial court's conclusion as to whether defendant had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy under a correctness 
standard, affording no deference." 842 P.2d at 914. 
"Utah case lam teaches that 'correctness' means 'the 
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not 
defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
lam.' Thus, the broadest scope of judicial review extends 
to questions of law." Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah 
Standards of tippet late tie<//enr, Utah Bar Journal, October 
1994, at 21, quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) and State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
Under the correctness standard the denial of Pierce's 
motion to suppress should be reversed. From the analysis 
of the relevant case law and legal authorities, it is clear 
under the property abandonment inquiry that Pierce did not 
abandon his expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its 
contents, specifically in the marijuana in a duffel bag in 
the trunk. Looking at the objective facts, words spoken, 
29 
acts done ana nerce s intent, tnere is not suuicieru 
support for the abandonment conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Pierce as the lawful possessor had legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its contents 
which he maintained throughout his illegal detention and 
therefore the evidence improperly seized should have been 
suppressed. 
For the reasons stated above, the order denying the 
motion to suppress should be reversed and the case remanded 
for dismissal of charges. 
Respectfully submitted this C S £ l _ day of April, 1995. 
Sandra U. Star ley' 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ntftfuitfvit 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6-46. Speed 
Regulations—Safe and Appropriate Speeds at Certain 
Locations—Priia Facie Speed Limits—Emergency 
Power of Governor. 
(2) If no special hazard exists, and subject to Sub-
section (4) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the 
following speeds ore lawful: 
(d) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6-48.5, any speed 
in excess of the limits provided in Subsection (2) is 
prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or 
prudent and that it is unlawful. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(2) Prohibited acts B ~ Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally 
to possess or use a controlled substance, unless 
it was obtained under a valid prescription or 
order , , . or as otherwise authorized by this 
subsection. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-19-103 
(1) H tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled 
substances as defined under this chapter at the following 
rates: 
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a 
gram, $3.50. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6. 
R i ght s o f de fendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases. 
a 
Court of Appeal8 jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree 
or capital felony. 
Rule 11(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of 
guilty, guilty and mentally III, or no contest, reserving 
in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to 
a review of the adverse determination of any specified 
pre-trial motion, fl defendant who prevails on appeal 
shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(2) fin appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
Ca) the final judgment of conviction, whether by 
verdict or plea. 
Rule 3. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rppeal as of right: hot taken. 
(a) Filing appeal froi final orders and judgments. 
fin appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, or 
circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction 
over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, 
except as otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice 
of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the 
time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of 
appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is 
ground only for such action a3 the appellate court deems 
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or 
other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award 
of attorney fees. 
b 
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*rtained from the writing 
Sections 9-07-02, 9-07-
nc Construction, Inc v 
iperties, 344 N W 2d 679 
w ords of a contract are to 
their ordinary and popular 
. are used in a technical 
n a special meaning Sec 
DCC 
New World Dictionary, 
Edition, defines "pet" as 
is tamed or domesticated 
»mpanion or treated with 
>rdinary and popular defi-
ius not necessarily limited 
It is not clear from the 
er public nuisance" is uv 
and give a special mean-
o refer to some other use 
that might be a public 
igh the term public nui-
id to apply to horses and 
• may be read to prevent 
property that might be 
a pubbc nuisance More-
ion of the city ordinance 
as argued by Schuch, 
atency because the ordi-
jrses and the agreement 
o horses Extrinsic evh 
u> explain that inconsist-
jaion of the ordinance as 
Tient requires the consid-
>ic evidence beyond the 
he agreement in order to 
nship of the ordinance to 
That reliance on extrinsic 
an indication of an ambi-
ning of paragraph 10 is 
face of the agreement, 
that rational arguments 
afferent interpretations of 
We therefore agree with 
t paragraph 10 is ambigu-
gTeement of the parties 
e of the property for am-
-ract is ambiguous extnn-
misaible to determine the 
rtiea, and a trial court's 
that intent from extrinsic 
eation of fact subject to 
Rule 52(a), N D R Civ P National Bank 
of Harvey v International Harvester Co 
supra, Graber v Engstrom, 384 N W 2d 
307 (N D 1986) A finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous when, although there is some 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake was 
made Id. 
[4] In this case the trial court heard 
conflicting evidence on the intent of the 
parties and resolved that conflict in favor 
of Heupel and against Schuch the party 
who prepared the agreement Section 9-
07-19, N D C C , Graber v Engstrom, su 
pro. We are not left with a definite and 
firm conviction that the trial court made a 
mistake in resolving the conflicting evi 
dence Accordingly, we conclude that the 
trial court's findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous 
The judgment is affirmed 
ERICKSTAD, CJ, and LEVINE, 
MESCHKE and GIERKE, JJ , concur 
[o Iitmtmiti «St$TtM> 
STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
David L. HUETHER, Defendant 
and Appellee 
Cr. No. 890261. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota 
March 27, 1990 
State appealed from order of the D«* 
tnct Court, Grant County, South Central 
Judicial District Gerald G Glaser J sup-
pressing evidence obtained in warrantless 
search of defendant's pickup truck The 
Supreme Court, Levine J, held that 0> 
defendant did not abandon paper bag con 
STATE v HUETHER 
C U * M 4 S 3 N.WJd 77S (N.D 1990) 
taming controlled substance, (2) police offi- 6. Criminal Law 
cer who received defendant's consent to 
search defendant's vehicle for open alcohol 
ic beverage containers exceeded scope of 
consent when he opened brown paper bag 
that was partly under front seat of vehicle, 
and (3) officer did not have probable cause 
to believe that paper bag contained alcohol-
ic beverage container 
Affirmed 
N D 779 
1158(1) 
Because resolution of whether place or 
object has been abandoned depends upon 
factual inquiry ultimate determination is 
reviewed under clearlj erroneous standard 
U S C A Const Amend 4 
1. Criminal Law *»U58(4) 
Trial court's disposition on motion to 
suppress will not be reversed if, after con-
flicts in testimony are resolved in favor of 
affirmance, there is sufficient competent 
evidence fairly capable of supporting trial 
court's determination 
2. Drugs and Narcotics «=»185.10 
Defendant who consented to police of 
fleer's search of his vehicle for open alco-
holic beverage containers did not abandon 
paper bag containing controlled substance 
when he told officer that "the bag wasn't 
his and he didn't know what was inside of 
it," where statement was made after con-
traband was uncovered USCA Const 
Amend 4 
I. Searches and Seizures *=»28 
Warrantless search or seizure of prop-
erty that has been abandoned does not 
violate Fourth Amendment USCA. 
Const Amend 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures ^ 2 8 
"Abandonment," in Fourth Amend 
ment sense, is primarily question of intent 
which may be inferred from words, acts or 
other objective facts, abandonment implies 
renunciation of any reasonable expectation 
of privacy and is question of fact US. 
C A Const Amend 4 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5 Searches and Seizures «=»28 
If person alleged to have abandoned 
property intends to retain his or her pnva 
cy interests in that property, there has 
been no abandonment USCA Const 
Amend 4 
7 Searches and Seizures *=»65 
There is no constitutional distinction 
between paper bags and other kinds of 
containers found in vehicle U S C A 
Const Amend 4 
8 Searches and Seizures «=»28 
Where disclaimer of ownership comes 
only after search of disclaimed article re-
veals contraband disclaimer, made in ef-
fort to avoid making incriminating state-
ment should not alone be deemed to consti-
tute abandonment USCA ConstAmend 
4 
9. Searches and Seizures «=»201 
Question of whether search exceeds 
scope of consent is factual one, and thus 
subject to clearly erroneous standard of 
review USCA ConstAmend 4 
10 Searches and Seizures *=>171. 186 
Consent search is exception to both 
warrant and probable cause requirements 
of Fourth Amendment, and must be con-
ducted according to limitations placed upon 
police officer's right to search by consent 
or search loses its validity U S C A 
Const Amend 4 
11. Searches and Seizures *»186 
Police officer who received defendant's 
consent to search defendant's vehicle for 
open alcoholic beverage containers exceed-
ed scope of consent when he opened brown 
paper bag that was partly under front seat 
of vehicle, where bag had neither weight 
nor shape of alcoholic beverage container 
U S C A Const Amend 4 
12. Automobiles *=»349 5(5) 
Police officer who conducted search of 
defendant's vehicle for open alcoholic bev-
erage containers did not have probable 
cause to believe that paper bag that was 
partially under front seat contained such a 
container bag was pushed partly under 
front seat in such manner as to give officer 
780 N D 453 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER. Zd 8>K.Kir.» 
no reason to believe it contained a bottle or 
can USC A Const Amend 4 
13 Criminal Law •=1158(4) 
Trial court at suppression hearing is in 
superior position to judge credibility of wit 
nesaes and weight to be accorded their 
testimony, conflicts in testimony must be 
resolved in favor of affirming trial court 
Phyllis Ann Ratchffe State's Atty , Car 
son, for plaintiff and appellant 
Vime Law Firm Bismarck, for defendant 
and appellee argued by Ralph A Vmje 
LEVINE Justice 
The State appeals from an order sup-
pressing evidence obtained in a warrantless 
search of David Huether's pickup truck 
We affirm 
R»ck Michels a state highway patrol offi 
cer, stopped Huether for speeding Mi 
chels detected the odor of alcohol on 
Huether's breath and asked if he had been 
dnnkmg Huether admitted to drinking 
and volunteered that there was an unopen 
ed six-pack of beer in his truck Michels 
suspected an open container and obtained 
Huether's consent to search the truck for 
open containers 
The officer opened the driver's door to 
Huether's truck and saw on the floor by 
the passenger seat a paper sack containing 
what he believed to be a six pack of beer 
However, he did not open this bag In 
stead he directed his attention to a small 
paper bag pushed partly under the front 
seat Huether told the officer that bag 
contained only garbage 
The officer pulled the bag from under 
the seat and opened it It contained thirty 
three packets later determined to contain 
amphetamine hydrochloride, a controlled 
substance Huether denied both ownership 
1 Although "standing" in its traditional form is 
no longer part of fourth amendment analysis 
the term continues to be used as convenient 
shorthand for the concept of "legitimate expec 
tation of privacy" See Rakas v Illinois 439 
MS 128 139 99 SCt 421 428 58 LEd 2d 387 
(1978) In Rakas the Supreme Court "discard 
ed reliance on concepts of standing in deter 
of the bag and knowledge of its contents 
He was then arrested and charged with 
possession with intent to deliver a con-
trolled substance in violation of NDCC 
$ 19-03 1~23<1 Kb) 
Huether moved to suppress the evidence 
of controlled substance The district court 
granted the motion to suppress, finding 
that the search of the paper bag exceeded 
the scope of Huether's consent, was not 
supported by probable cause and that 
Huether had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle The State appealed, 
challenging these determinations 
(1) The trial court's disposition on a 
motion to suppress will not be reversed if, 
after conflicts in the testimony are resolved 
in favor of affirmance there is sufficient 
competent evidence fairly capable of sup-
porting the trial court's determination 
State v Lorenzen, 401 N W 2d 508, 608 
(N D 1987) With that standard in mind, 
we consider the State's arguments for re-
versal 
12] The State first argues that Huether 
does not have "standing" * to contest the 
search of the paper bag because he aban 
doned the paper bag and therefore relin-
quished any legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in it The State does not dispute 
Huether's ownership, occupation or control 
of the vehicle in which the paper bag was 
found, his possession of the paper bag at 
the time of the search or his control over it 
Instead the State argues that when Hueth 
er stated to the police officer, after the 
contraband was uncovered, that "the bag 
wasn't his and he didn t know what was 
inside of it" he lost any expectation of 
privacy in the bag 
f3-6] A warrantless search or seizure 
of property that has been abandoned does 
not violate the fourth amendment United 
States v Thomas, 864 F 2d 843 (D C Cir 
mining whether a defendant is entitled to claim 
the protections of the exclusionary rule The 
inquiry after Rakas is simply whether the de 
fendant s rights were violated by the allegedly 
illegal search or seizure " United States v Sal 
vuccx 448 U.S 83 87 n 4 100 SCt 2547 2551 
n 4 65 L Ed 2d 619 (1980) 
CM* M « « N W_M 
1989) Abandonment, in the fourth amend 
ment sense is primarily a question of in 
tent which may be inferred from words 
acts and other objective facts United 
States v Bumette, 698 F 2d 1038 (9th 
Cir) cert denied, 461 U S 936 103 S Ct 
2106 77 LEd 2d 312 (1983) Abandonment 
implies a renunciation of any reasonable 
expectation of privacy and is a question of 
fact United States v Alden 576 F 2d 772 
(8th Cir) cert denied, 439 US 855 99 
SCt 167 58 LEd 2d 161 (1978) If the 
person alleged to have abandoned property 
intends to retain his or her privacy interest 
in that property, there has been no aban 
donment United States v Burnette su 
pro. Because resolution of whether a 
place or object has been abandoned de-
pends upon a factual inquiry, the ultimate 
determination is reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard United States v 
Thomas supra 
The State points to Huether s denial of 
ownership as conclusive evidence of aban 
donment However, the trial court appar 
ently determined that Huether's disavowal 
of ownership of the paper bag standing 
alone was not a renunciation of Huether s 
reasonable expectation of pnvacy in the 
bag 
While a disclaimer of ownership or 
knowledge may well be evidence that a 
defendant does not reasonably expect the 
article to be free from intrusion State v 
Benjamin 417 N W 2d 838 (N D 1988) 
such disclaimer is "not necessarily the hall 
mark for deciding the substance of a 
fourth amendment claim " United States 
v Haukins 681 F 2d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir) 
cert denied, 459 US 994, 103 S Ct 354 74 
LEd 2d 391 (1982) As we said in State i 
Benjamin "[W]hile property ownership is 
a consideration, it neither begins nor ends 
2. The State relies heavily on United States v 
Veatch 674 F 2d 1217 (9th Cir 1981) to support 
its contention that the evidence seized should 
not have been suppressed Veatch was a pas-
senger in a vehicle occupied by two other per 
sons The vehicle was stopped and the officer 
noting a gun and wallet in plain view in the 
back seat where Veatch had been sitting asked 
Veatch if the wallet were his and if he wanted to 
take it with him Veatch denied ownership of 
the wallet The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court s finding that Veatch abandoned the 
77* (N D IWWI 
the inquiry 417 NW 2d at 840 But cf 
State i htodt 2W N W 2d 783 (N D 1980) 
(upholding search on baRis of plain view 
but conferring ' threshold standing' based 
either on ownership or legitimate expecta 
tion of pnvacy in vehicle or both ] In the 
same wa> that ownership alone may not be 
sufficient to confer or retain a reasonable 
expectation of pnvacy eg Benjamin, 
Thoma* supra disavowal of ownership 
alone ma) not be enough to relinquish 
one s reasonable expectation of pnvacy 
See Hawkins supra, Commonwealth v 
Hollouvy 9 VaApp 11 384 S E 2d 99 
(1989) This is especially true where, as 
here the paper bag is contained and con 
trolled *ithin an area where there is a 
legitimate expectation of pnvacy See Peo-
ple v Cameron 73 Misc 2d 790, 342 N Y 
S 2d 773 (Sup Ct 1973) Huether did not 
discard or place the bag in a public place 
Cf City of St Paul ? Vaughn 306 Minn 
337 237 N W 2d 365 (1975) [defendant who 
tucked eyeglass case under a counter at 
business establishment had no reasonable 
continued expectancy of pnvacy in the dis 
carded property] 
17,8] There is little doubt that Huether 
had an expectation of pnvacy in his vehicle 
and in every container therein that con 
cealed its contents from plain view Unit 
ed States v Ross 456 U S 798, 823, 102 
SCt 2157 2172 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982) 
There is no constitutional distinction be 
twe«*n paper bags and other kinds of con 
tamers Id Furthermore where the dis 
claimer comes only after the search of the 
disclaimed article reveals contraband the 
disclaimer made in an effort to avoid mak 
mg an incriminating statement should not 
alone be deemed to constitute abandon 
ment1 State v Isom, 196 Mont 330, 641 
wallet and any reasonable expectation of pnva 
cy in il We believe the primary distinction that 
renders Veatch inapposite is that Vealch was a 
passenger in a vehicle and thus dtd not have any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle 
Further his disclaimer of ownership preceded 
the search of the wallet The abandonment was 
therefore complete by the time the officer 
searched the wallet leaving Veatch with no pn 
vac> interest in the wallet at the time of the 
search The *ame court which decided Veatch 
7 8 2 N D 453 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
P2d 417 (1982), State v Machtah, 505 
N E 2d 873 (Ind CtApp 1987), 4 W La-
Fave, Search and Seizure § 11 3(0 at 343 
Under the circumstances, we find no error 
in the district court's underlying determina-
tion that Huether had an expectation of 
privacy m the bag thereby retaining the 
protection of the fourth amendment 
191 The State next argues that the 
search of the paper bag was within the 
scope of Huether's consent The question 
whether a search exceeds the scope of con-
sent is a factual one, United States v 
Mines, 883 F 2d 801, 803 (9th Cir), cert 
denied, — US , 110 S Ct 552, 107 
LEd 2d 549 (1989), and thus subject to the 
clearly erroneous standard of review See 
State v Padgett, 393 N W 2d 754, 757 
(ND1986), State v Packmeau, 423 
NW2d 148, 151 n 1 (N D 1988) 
[10] A consent search is an exception to 
both the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of the fourth amendment 
Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 U.S 218, 
219, 93 S Ct 2041. 2043, 3£ L Ed 2d 854 
(1973), Mines, supra. See State v Gron-
lund, 356 N W 2d 144 (N D 1$84) It must 
be conducted according to the limitations 
placed upon an officer's right to search by 
the consent or the search loses its validity 
United States v McBean, 861 F 2d 1570 
(11th Or 1988) 
(111 The trial court found that "There 
is some difference as to exactly what was 
said, but there is no dispute that the defen-
dant consented to the search of his vehicle 
but for the limited purpose of determining 
whether there was an open receptacle con-
taining an alcoholic beverage " This find-
ing is supported by the officer's testimony 
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q I'm go-
ing to read from your preliminary hear-
ing just briefly 'I then asked Mr 
Huether if I could check his vehicle, 
search—check for open containers, and 
he said, yes, I could There was nothing 
recognized in United States v Burnette, 698 F 2d 
1038 1048 n. 19 (9ih Cir ) cert denied, 461 U S 
936 103 SCl 2106 77 L Ed 2d 312 (1983) that a 
mere disclaimer is usually not enough to consti 
tute abandonment Generally abandonment is 
found only where the disclaimer is coupled with 
open in there' Is that a correct state-
ment of what occurred7 
"[OFFICER MICHELS] A I believe 
so, yes 
"Q So, your permission to search 
was limited to searching for open con-
tainers, is that correct7 
"A That was my intent, yes " 
The trial court found that the search of 
the paper bag exceeded the scope of Hueth-
er's consent because, given the paper bag's 
appearance and location, it could not rea-
sonably be expected to contain the open 
container for which the officer was autho-
rized by Huether's consent to search A 
more likely receptacle, but one into which 
the officer did not look, was the larger 
paper sack on the floor by the/ront passen-
ger seat In this larger paper sack, the 
trial court found, the officer could detect 
"what was apparently a '6-pa/ik' " Yet, as 
the trial court noted, the officer chose to 
ignore the obvious and zero in on the much 
smaller bag tucked partly under the front 
seat That the smaller bag could not have 
held a bottle or a can became obvious once 
the officer pulled it from under the seat 
Although this bag had neither the weight 
nor the shape of an alcoholic beverage con-
tainer the officer "decided nevertheless to 
open the sack to see what was in i t " This 
was impermissible under United States v 
Ross, 456 US 798, 102 S Ct 2157, 72 
L Ed 2d 572 (1982) 
Ron* involved a warrantless vehicle 
search conducted pursuant to probable 
cause rather than consent The Court in 
Ross held that the scope of a search ts 
defined by the object of the search and ts 
thus limited to places in which there ts 
probable cause to believe that it may be 
found Id The rule articulated in Ross 
has also been applied to consent searches 
United States v Kapperman, 764 F 2d 786 
(11th Cir 1985), United States v White, 
706 F2d 806 (7th Cir 1983) See 3 W La-
a physical relinquishment of the property See 
United States v Kendall 655 F 2d 199 (9th Cir ) 
cert denied, 455 US 941, 102 S Ct 1434 71 
LEd 2d 652 (1981) United States v Jackson, 
544 F 2d 407 (9th Cir 1976) 
STATE v PICKAR 
Cite a* 433 N WJW 7 W | N D IS 
N D 783 
Fave, Search and Seizure § 8 1(c) at 165-
67 [a description of the objects to be sought 
in search limits scope of that 9earch] 
In essence, the State argues that Hueth 
er's authonzation to Michels constituted 
general consent to search his vehicle The 
trial court found otherwise determining 
that Michels exceeded the scope of Hueth 
er's consent and conducted a general ex 
ploratory search We conclude that the 
trial court's finding was not clearly errone-
ous 
[121 Finally, the State argues that the 
search was nevertheless valid because the 
officer had probable cause to believe that 
the bag might contain the open container 
This argument fails for the same reason 
the consent argument fails the district 
court found that the bag could not reason 
ably be expected to conceal an open con 
tamer Ross, supra, 456 U S at 824, 102 
S Ct at 2172 See State v Schinzing, 342 
N W 2d 105, 109-110 (Minn 1983) [suggest-
ing officer could not reasonably believe 
that an open container could be in an ash-
tray] 
The district court found that the "paper 
sack [was] pushed partly under the front 
seat in such a manner as to give the officer 
no reason to believe it contained a bottle or 
can " The State disputes this finding, 
arguing, "It is not unreasonable for the 
officer to believe that a can could have 
been quickly crushed, stuffed in the sack 
and hurriedly attempted, albeit unsuccess 
fully, to be jammed under the seat " While 
there is testimony to that effect there is 
also contrary testimony which supports the 
district court's finding 
[13J The trial court is in a superior posi-
tion to judge the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be accorded their testi-
mony See State v Pickar, 453 N W 2d 
783 (N D 1990) Conflicts in testimony 
must be resolved in favor of affirming the 
trial court Lorenzen, supra. In this in-
stance, affirming the trial court means af 
firming the suppression order We con-
clude that there is sufficient competent evi-
dence supporting the trial court's order 
and, accordingly, we affirm 
ERICKSTAD, C J , and VANDEWALL, 
MESCHKE and GIERKE, JJ , concur 
STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
r. 
Ross PICKAR, Defendant and Appellee. 
Cr. No. 890270. 
Supreme Court of North Dakota 
March 27, 1990 
In prosecution for two counts of man-
slaughter stemming from a single-vehicle 
roll-over accident in which two of defen* 
dant's friends were killed, defendant moved 
to suppress his confession The District 
Court, Griggs County, Northeast Central 
Judicial District Bruce E Bohlman, J , 
granted defendant's motion upon determin-
ing that the confession was involuntary 
The State appealed The Supreme Court, 
Levine, J , held that the trial court's find-
ings with respect to the accused's physical 
and mental condition and prior experience 
with the police as well as with respect to 
the coerciveness of the police conduct dur-
ing the interrogation, including the interro-
gation techniques used by the police such 
as playing on the accused's guilt and sense 
of duty to the family of his deceased 
friends as well as offering the accused an 
implied inducement of no prosecution in the 
event of his confession, were not contrary 
to the manifest weight of the evidence and 
supported the trial court's determination of 
involuntanness 
Affirmed 
there was silent concerning the 
> between the decedent and his 
d it appears the verdict included 
0 for nonpecuniary damages, 
imount to be awarded for nonpe-
nages is a question for the jury, 
before us, there was no award 
parents for their nonpecuniary 
s jury in this case had awarded 
wo or three thousand dollars 
the medical and burial expenses, 
» would be a more difficult one. 
n a wrongful death action, the 
ts is not required as a matter of 
rd damages for any or all of the 
authorized by K.S.A. 60-1904. 
owever, must not disregard the 
idence and award nothing when 
clearly discloses an entitlement 
i for at least some of the ele-
which recovery is permitted, 
before us convinces us the ver-
ladequate that it indicates pas-
ejudice on the part of the jury 
s a new trial. 
The question arises whether 
*e entitled to a new trial on all 
one limited to the nature and 
lamages. Prior to the advent of 
\ negligence (K.S.A. 60-258a), a 
ould be limited to the issue of 
len that issue and liability were 
id the interests of justice would 
y a separate trial on the single 
lew trial on both issues was 
en the record indicated that in-
adequate damages were awarded as a com-
promise on the issues of liability and dam-
ages. Corman, Administrator v. WEG Dial 
Telephone, Inc., 194 Kan. 783, 402 P.2d 112; 
Timmerman v. Schroeder, 203 Kan. 397, 
401-02, 454 P.2d 522 (1969). In fairness to 
the trial judge here, we note that plaintiffs 
did not file a motion for a new trial; thus, 
the trial judge had no opportunity to rule 
on the adequacy of the verdict. Such a 
motion is not necessary, however, for us to 
consider the issue on appeal. Atkinson v. 
Orkin Exterminating Co., 5 Kan.App.2d 
739, 625 P.2d 505, atfd on review, 230 Kan. 
277, 634 P.2d 1071 (1981). The jury in this 
case was instructed to fix damages without 
considering the percentage of fault of the 
parties. In view of the instruction on com-
parative fault, of the instruction not to 
consider the percentage of fault in fixing 
damages, and of the jury's finding of fault 
within a range which we feel is supported 
by the record, we are unable to say the 
inadequate damages were awarded as a 
compromise on the issue of liability. 
Reversed and remanded with directions 
to grant a new trial on the issue of damages 
only. 
| wwtiKisfstufr 
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Rehearing Denied March 15, 1982. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court of the First Judicial District, in 
and for the County of Lewis and Clark, 
Peter Meloy, J., of felony possession of dan-
gerous drugs, and he appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Daly, J., held that: (1) de-
fendant had standing to contest legality of 
search of residence where he was overnight 
guest; (2) defendant had standing to con-
test search of his car and garbage bags 
found in its trunk even though he denied 
ownership of car at time of search; and (3) 
district court erred in determining there 
was probable cause for search warrant and, 
thus, searches of house and car were in 
violation of Fourth Amendment and evi-
dence resulting from searches was not ad-
missible against defendant. 
Reversed and cause dismissed. 
Haswell, C. J., and Sheehy, J., con-
curred in result. 
Weber, J., dissented with opinion. 
1. Searches and Seizures *=»7(26) 
Test for standing to challenge legality 
of search is not to be based on distinctions 
out of property and tort law and, rather, 
legitimate expectation of privacy makes it 
clear that capacity to claim protection of 
the Fourth Amendment depends not upon 
property right in invaded place, but upon 
whether area was one in which there was 
reasonable expectation of freedom from 
government intrusion. U.S.C.A.Const 
Amend. 4. 
Cite u , Mont.. 641 P.2d 417 
2. Searches and Seizures *»7(26) 
Fact that defendant was overnight 
guest in residence searched would not con-
trol determination of his standing to contest 
legality of search of residence. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
3. Searches and Seizures <*=>7(26) 
Where confiscated evidence was found 
in areas where defendant slept and where 
he stored his belongings and defendant was 
sole occupant of residence at time of search 
and had control and dominion over it to 
exclusion of others, defendant did have 
standing to contest search of premises in 
which he was overnight guest. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
4. Searches and Seizures *=»7(27) 
Search and seizure disclaimer statute 
must be interpreted in light of Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. MCA 46-5-103(1); U.S.C.A.Const 
Amend. 5. 
5. Searches and Seizures <*=»7(27) 
Disclaimer of car does not necessarily 
operate as disclaimer of closed containers in 
car for purposes of search and seizure dis-
claimer statute. MCA 46-5-103(1). 
6. Searches and Seizures <*=»7(26) 
Although it has been held that owner 
of car or container will lose his standing to 
object to search of it if he abandons it prior 
to time of search, mere disclaimer of owner-
ship in effort to avoid making incriminating 
statement in response to police questioning 
should not alone be deemed to constitute 
abandonment. MCA 46-5-103(1). 
7. Searches and Seizures *»7(26) 
The Miranda limitations should apply 
to disclaimers when State uses them to 
deprive a person of Fourth Amendment 
standing. MCA 46-5-103(1); U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amends. 4, 5. 
8. Searches and Seizures *=>7(26) 
Where disclaimer was elicited from de-
fendant by direct police questioning after 
defendant was told to sit on couch and not 
leave, State could not be allowed to use 
defendant's disclaimer statements to de-
prive defendant of his standing to contest 
search of his car and search of garbage 
bags in its trunk. MCA 46-5-103(1); U.S. 
C.A.Const.Amend8. 4, 5. 
9. Searches and Seizures *»7(26) 
Even assuming that defendant's dis-
claimer of ownership of car could be con-
strued to deprive defendant of standing to 
contest search of car, disclaimer could not 
be construed to deprive defendant of stand-
ing to contest search of garbage bags found 
in trunk of car. MCA 46-5-103(1); U.S.C. 
A.Const.Amends. 4, 5. 
10. Searches and Seizures «=»3.6(2) 
When a search warrant has been is-
sued, determination of probable cause must 
be made solely from information given to 
impartial magistrate and from four corners 
of search warrant application. U.S.C.A. 
Con8t.Amend. 4. 
11. Drugs and Narcotics *=»188 
Where district court, in determining 
probable cause to issue search warrant, con-
sidered not only four corners of search war-
rant application but looked to evidence that 
one of parties involved was known drug 
dealer and evidence of informant's tip, dis-
trict court's determination of probable 
cause was error and would be vacated. 
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4. 
12. Drugs and Narcotics «=»188 
Where there was nothing in record 
showing some of underlying circumstances 
from which informant concluded that nar-
cotics were where he claimed they were and 
there was nothing in record showing under-
lying circumstances from which officer con-
cluded that informant was credible or his 
information was reliable, district court erro-
neously relied upon information received 
from informant in determining whether 
there was probable cause to issue search 
warrant. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4. 
13. Searches and Seizures <*=> 3.6(2) 
Probable cause to issue search warrant 
exists when facts and circumstances 
presented to magistrate would warrant an 
honest belief in mind of reasonable and 
prudent man that offense has been, or is 
being, committed and that property sought 
exists at place designated; in other words, 
search warrant application must recite un-
derlying facts and circumstances from 
which magistrate can determine validity of 
affiant's conclusion that certain evidence 
exists at a particular premises. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 4. 
14. Searches and Seizures <*=>3.6(2) 
Mere taking of opaque green garbage 
bag out of residence and finding of similar 
green garbage bag in alley near spot where 
deputies lost sight of party they were fol-
lowing did not establish probable cause for 
search of residence. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 
4. 
15. Drugs ami Narcotics «=»188 
Fact that affiant believed that vehicle 
was used to convey marijuana and other 
dangerous drugs to residence described was 
not sufficient to establish probable cause to 
search car parked in front of residence. 
U.S.C.A.ConstAmend. 4. 
16. Searches and Seizures <*=»3.6(2) 
Mere affirmation of belief or suspicion 
by police officer, absent any underlying 
facts or circumstances, does not establish 
probable cause for issuance of search war-
rant. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4. 
Leo Gallagher argued, Helena, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., John Maynard, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, Charles Graveley, 
County Atty., Steve Garrison, Deputy 
County Atty., argued, Helena, for plaintiff 
and respondent 
DALY, Justice. 
Defendant was charged by information 
with possession of dangerous drugs with 
intent to sell, as provided in section 45-9-
103(1), MCA. He pleaded not guilty. His 
motion to suppress was denied by the Dis-
trict Court of the First Judicial District, 
Lewis and Clark County. After a jury trial 
defendant was found guilty of felony pos-
CHe as, Mont., i 
session of dangerous drugs, a lesser includ-
ed offense of possession with intent to sell. 
On October 15, 1980, the defendant was 
sentenced to five years in the Montana 
State Prison, with two years suspended. 
Defendant appeals his conviction. 
Based on information from an informant, 
the Lewis and Clark County Sheriffs De-
partment placed under surveillance the resi-
dence located at 1014 Elm Street, Helena, 
Montana. About noon on January 11,1980, 
two deputy sheriffs observed a man later 
identified as John Stemple, a suspected 
drug dealer, leave the Elm Street residence. 
He was carrying a large green garbage bag 
which he put into a tool box in the back of 
his pickup truck parked in front of the 
residence. 
Stemple went back into the residence. A 
brown Ford station wagon pulled up. A 
man later identified as the defendant got 
out of the station wagon and went into the 
residence. Stemple then left the residence 
and drove away in his pickup, followed by 
the two deputies in an unmarked car. 
According to the deputies, Stemple made 
evasive maneuvers by turning several cor-
ners sharply. They lost sight of Stemple 
and called for the aid of a third officer. 
The third officer stopped Stemple within a 
matter of minutes. 
The officers searched Stemple's truck but 
could not find the green garbage bag that 
Stemple had placed in the tool box. Be-
cause of a recent snowfall the officers were 
able to retrace the tracks of the pickup. 
The tracks led to an alley behind a gas 
station where they found a large green 
garbage bag which apparently had been 
placed there recently since it was not cover-
ed with snow. The deputies looked inside 
the bag and found it full of marijuana 
contained in small plastic bags. 
An officer went to get a search warrant 
for the Elm Street residence and for a 
maroon Chrysler Cordoba parked in front of 
the residence which the officers believed 
had been used to transport narcotics. A 
search warrant for both the residence and 
the car was issued by a justice of the peace. 
The warrant application contained the 
UlP.2d417 
above information, except there was 
mention of the surveillance being based 
an informant's tip and no mention Ui 
John Stemple was a suspected drug deal 
At least eight officers and the couri 
attorney executed the search warrai 
When the officers arrived at the Elm Strc 
residence, they noticed that the motor w 
running on the Chrysler. A couple of of 
cers stayed with the car, while the oth< 
went to search the residence. Defends 
answered the door of the residence. T 
officers handed him the search warrant 
they entered. Defendant was only weari 
a pair of blue jeans. He testified that 
was half-dressed because he was getti 
ready to take a shower. Defendant * 
ordered to sit on the couch and not to lea 
the room. 
Defendant was the only occupant of 1 
residence when the officers entered, 
was a guest of his uncle who rented 1 
residence. He had been sleeping on 1 
couch in the living room and had stored 
belongings in the living room and in a hi 
room. 
The officers searched the entire hou 
finding marijuana residue and drug pa 
phernalia in nearly every room, includi 
the living room, bathroom and kitchen, 
small plastic bag of marijuana was found 
the bedroom of defendant's uncle. 
One uniformed officer was told to 0 
with defendant and watch him while 
others completed the search. He asked 
fendant if he owned the car parked in fr 
of the residence Defendant said he did 
own the car. In response to further qi 
tioning, defendant said he did not kr 
who did own the car and did not kr 
where the keys to the car's trunk w 
located. Defendant was not arrested pi 
to these questions and had not been give 
Miranda warning. 
The officers searched the car. U] 
finding the glove compartment and 
trunk locked, they forced the glove OJ 
partment open, and inside it they four* 
key to open the trunk. Inside the trunk 
officers found several large green garb 
r* which contained approximately eighty 
ninety pounds of marijuana. After the 
rch of the residence and the car, defend-
was arrested. 
X the suppression hearing, defendant in-
iuced evidence to show that he owned 
car in which the marijuana was found, 
his case may be resolved by looking at 
three primary issues presented: 
Whether the defendant has standing 
:>ntest the legality of the search of the 
lence where he was an overnight guest; 
Whether the defendant has standing 
ontest the search of his car and the 
age bags found in its trunk when he 
id ownership of the car at the time of 
earch; and 
Whether the District Court erred in 
snial of defendant's motion to suppress 
nee seized from the residence and the 
th respect to defendant's standing to 
st the search of the house, the State 
1 have this Court adopt the perspective 
•easoning of the most recent United 
B Supreme Court decisions which have 
jled the automatic standing rule of 
v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 257, 
Dt 726, 4 LEd.2d 697. See, United 
i v. Salvucci (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 100 
2647, 65 LEd.2d 619, and Rawlings v. 
\cky (1980), 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct 
55 L.Ed.2d 633. 
as had set down two alternative hold-
(1) when the fruits of a search are 
ed to be used against a defendant at 
ial, he has "automatic standing" to 
t the legality of the search; and (2) 
i "legitimately on the premises where 
3h occurs may challenge its legality 
y of a motion to suppress". Jones, 
9. at 267, 80 S.Ct at 734. The pur-
' the automatic standing rule was to 
,he "vice of prosecutorial self-con tra-
' in which the State could charge a 
with possession as a crime, and at 
le time claim that the possession was 
ficient to give the person standing to 
re the legality of the search or sei-
lee, Brown v. United States (1973), 
. 223, 93 S.Ct 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208. 
In overruling the automatic standing rule 
in Jones, both Salvucci and Rawlings relied 
heavily upon the earlier case of Rakas v. 
Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 
L.Ed.2d 387. 
In Rakas, the Court stated that the Jones 
test of "legitimately on the premises" can-
not be taken in its full sweep beyond the 
facts of that one case. Rather, said the 
Court, the true test of whether a Fourth 
Amendment right has been violated is 
found in Katz v. United States (1967), 389 
U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, in 
which the Supreme Court said that the ca-
pacity to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment depends not upon a property 
right in the invaded place but upon whether 
the person who claims the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment has a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the invaded place. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S.Ct at 512; 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct at 430. 
[1] Notwithstanding the limitations 
placed on Jones, the Court in Rakas, and 
again in Salvucci, emphasized that owner-
ship is not a key element in determining 
standing. The test for standing is not to be 
based on distinctions out of property and 
tort law: "In defining the scope of that 
interest, we adhere to the view expressed in 
Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane 
distinctions in property and tort law be-
tween guests, licensees, invitees, and the 
like ought not to control." See Jones, 362 
U.S. at 266, 80 S.Ct at 733; Rakas, 439 U.S. 
at 143, 99 S.Ct at 430; Salvucci, US U.S. at 
91, 100 S.Ct at 2553; and Rawlings, 448 
U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct at 2561. The control-
ling view, then, seems to be that expressed 
in Mancusi v. DeForte (1968), 392 U.S. 364, 
88 S.Ct 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154, in which the 
Court said that the Katx teat of." legiti-
mate expectation of privacy' makes it clear 
that capacity to claim the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment depends not upon a 
property right in the invaded place, but 
upon whether the area was one in which 
there was a reasonable expectation of free-
dom from governmental intrusion." See 
Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 368, 88 S.Ct at 2124. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Following the rationale that ownership is 
not the controlling factor in the determina-
tion of standing, although it is one factor to 
consider, the Supreme Court has pointed 
out that the actual holding in Jones was not 
overruled. In Rawlings, the Court referred 
to parts of Rakas which explained why the 
defendant in Jones would still have stand-
ing under the recent narrow tests for stand-
ing. The Court in Rakas reasoned that the 
defendant in Jones, who was using an 
apartment with the tenant's permission, 
would continue to have standing under the 
recent tests because the defendant "had 
complete dominion and control over the 
apartment and could exclude others from 
it." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149, 99 S.Ct. at 433. 
The Court in Rakas also reasoned that the 
defendant in Katz, who was in a phone 
booth, had standing to contest a search of 
the booth because he had an expectation of 
privacy when he "shut the door behind him 
to exclude all others and paid the toll." 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149, 99 S.Ct. at 433. 
In State v. Allen (1980), Mont, 612 P.2d 
199, 37 St.Rep. 919, this Court quoted ex-
tensively from Rakas, acknowledging the 
distinctions between Rakas, Jones and Katz. 
See, Allen, 612 P.2d at 201-202. 
Here, the District Court made two find-
ings of fact that relate to defendant's 
standing to contest the search of the resi-
dence: (1) that defendant was an overnight 
guest at the residence which was rented by 
his uncle; and (2) that defendant had 
stored clothing, luggage and other personal 
property in limited areas of the residence, 
none of which included the areas where the 
confiscated evidence was found. 
Based on the above findings, the District 
Court concluded as a matter of law that 
"the defendant, being an overnight guest in 
the residence with items stored only in a 
limited area therein, had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the areas where the 
items were found, therefore, has no stand-
ing to object to their admission." 
The fact that the defendant was an over-
night guest should not control the determi-
nation of standing, although it is one factor 
to consider. As was noted in the above 
v. ISOM Mont. 421 
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discussion, protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures does not depend upon 
a property right in the invaded place, but 
rather upon whether the area was one in 
which there was a reasonable expectation 
of freedom from governmental intrusion. 
See, Allen, 612 P.2d at 202. 
Moreover, although the order of the Dis-
trict Court must be presumed correct upon 
appeal, State v. District Court (1978), 176 
Mont. 257, 577 P.2d 849, the record clearly 
does not support the finding that confiscat-
ed evidence was not found in the areas 
where defendant had stored his persona) 
belongings. Uncontradicted testimony at 
the suppression hearing showed that de-
fendant slept on the living room couch 
while he was the guest of his uncle and that 
he stored his belongings in the living room 
and in his nephew's bedroom. Although 
evidence at the suppression hearing showed 
that his uncle's bedroom was the only area 
where a small bag of marijuana was seized, 
it was made clear at the trial that evidence 
was seized from the living room table, from 
the living room fireplace, beside a wall in 
the living room, and from the living room 
closet. 
Defendant was the sole occupant of the 
house at the time the search was made. 
Like the defendants in Jones and Katz, 
defendant could exclude all others except 
his uncle and family and had dominion and 
control over the premises at the time the 
officers entered the residence. 
[2,3] In summary, the District Court's 
conclusion that defendant lacked standing 
to contest the search of the premises must 
be reversed on the following grounds: (1) 
the fact that the defendant was an over-
night guest should not control a determina-
tion of his standing to contest the legality 
of a search_of the residence; (2) the record 
shows that confiscated evidence was found 
in areas where the defendant slept and 
where he stored his belongings; and (3) the 
record supports a finding that the defend-
ant was the sole occupant of the residence 
at the time of the search and had control 
and dominion over it to the exclusion of 
others. 
The State urges this Court that the next 
issue which must be discussed is whether 
defendant had standing to contest the 
search of his car. The State claims that 
because defendant denied his ownership of 
the car, he waived his Fourth Amendment 
rights in it and in the garbage bags found 
in its trunk. 
The State argues that section 46-5-
103(1), MCA, deprives the defendant of 
standing to contest the search of his car and 
the search of the garbage bags found in its 
trunk. Section 46-6-103(1), MCA, pro-
vides: 
"No search and seizure, whether with or 
without warrant, shall be held illegal as 
to a defendant if: 
"(1) the defendant has disclaimed any 
right to or interest in the place or object 
searched or the instruments, articles, or 
things seized;" 
[4,5] The State's argument fails for two 
reasons: the disclaimer statute must be in-
terpreted in light of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination; and, a 
disclaimer of a car does not necessarily o|>-
erate as a disclaimer of the closed contain-
ers in the car. 
[6] Although it has been held that the 
owner of a car or a container will lose his 
standing to object to the search of it if he 
abandons it prior to the time of the search, 
United States v. Anderson (5th Cir. 1974), 
500 F.2d 1311; United States v. Colbert 
(5th Cir. 1973), 474 F.2d 174; and United 
States v. Afi7/er (1st Cir. 1978), 589 F.2d 
1117, a mere disclaimer of ownership in an 
effort to avoid making an incriminating 
statement in response to police questioning 
should not alone be deemed to constitute 
abandonment. See, LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, Vol. 3 at 581. Given the position 
that a defendant does not otherwise have to 
incriminate himself to preserve his Fourth 
Amendment rights, as in Simmons v. Unit* 
ed States (1968), 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 
19 L.Ed.2d 1247, it is difficult to understand 
how a refusal to make incriminating admis-
sions in response to police interrogation can 
be held to deprive a person of Fourth 
Amendment standing. 
To say that there is no Fifth Amendment 
violation because the defendant could have 
simply chosen to be silent is to ignore the 
whole line of principles set down in Miranda 
and its progeny. Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966), 884 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694. 
The point of the Miranda warning was to 
provide a safeguard against the coercive 
pressures of in-custody interrogation by po-
lice, when those pressures are so great as to 
undermine an individual's will, compelling 
him to speak when he would not otherwise 
do so. 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624. 
"Custodial interrogation" was found to be 
inherently coercive. The Miranda Court 
defined "custodial interrogation" as "ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement offi-
cers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way" 384 
U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. 
[7] Clearly, the Miranda limitations 
should apply to disclaimers when the State 
uses them to deprive a person of Fourth 
Amendment standing. 
[8] Here, the totality of the circum-
stances suggests that the disclaimer result-
ed from "custodial interrogation." The de-
fendant was told to sit on the couch and not 
leave. A uniformed officer was ordered to 
watch the defendant and stay with him 
while five other officers searched the house. 
The defendant was not free to walk around 
the house. The disclaimer was elicited from 
defendant by direct police questioning. 
Given this coercive atmosphere and the 
questioning, the State cannot be allowed to 
use such statements to deprive defendant of 
his Fourth Amendment rights. 
[9] Notwithstanding the Fifth Amend-
ment limitations on section 46-5-103(1), 
MCA, and assuming that the disclaimer 
could be construed to deprive the defendant 
of standing to contest the search of the car, 
in light of Robbins v. California (1981), 453 
U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744, 
the disclaimer could not be construed to 
deprive the defendant of standing to con-
cite as, Mont., 
test the search of the garbage bags found 
in the trunk of the car. 
In Robbins, the Court held that while 
police may have conducted a lawful search 
of an automobile under the automobile ex-
ception, they must nevertheless secure a 
warrant for any container found in the 
trunk of the car. The Court recognized 
that the expectation of privacy in a closed 
container taken from a car is not necessari-
ly less than the privacy expectation in 
closed pieces of luggage found elsewhere. 
Following a similar reasoning, it cannot 
be said that the defendant lost his expecta-
tion of privacy in the opaque garbage bags 
when he disclaimed ownership of the car. 
While it is arguable that the disclaimer 
weakened the defendant's expectation of 
privacy in the car, it cannot be said to have 
affected his expectation of privacy in the 
garbage bags. The disclaimer, therefore, in 
no way affected defendant's standing to 
contest the search of the garbage bags. 
[10] The next issue which must be dis-
cussed is whether the District Court proper-
ly denied defendant's motion to suppress. 
As many cases in Montana have held, when 
a search warrant has been issued, the deter-
mination of probable cause must be made 
solely from the information given to the 
impartial magistrate and from the four cor-
ners of the search warrant application. 
See, Art. II, Sec. 11, 1972 Mont.Const.; 
Thomson v. Onstad (1979), 182 Mont. 119, 
594 P.2d 1137, 36 St.Rep. 910; State v. 
Olson (1979), 181 Mont. 323, 589 P.2d 663, 36 
St.Rep. 146; State v. Leistiko (1978), 176 
Mont. 434, 578 P.2d 1161; State ex rel. 
Townsend v. District Court (1975), 168 
Mont. 357, 543 P.2d 193; Application of 
Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532. 
[11] Here the evidence is uncontradicted 
that the only information given to the jus-
tice of the peace was the information con-
tained in the search warrant and the search 
warrant application. Nevertheless, the Dis-
trict Court, in its order denying the motion 
to suppress, did not look to the validity of 
the search warrant and the sufficiency of 
the information before the neutral magis-
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trate. Rather, the District Court loc 
whether the officers had probable a 
search the residence and the vehicle 
in front of the residence. The I 
Court made the following conclusi 
law: 
"The officer's observation of John 
pie leaving the duplex with a g 
bag later found to contain mar 
when joined with the with prior 
edge of his drug sale involvemei 
the information that the officers > 
ceived regarding the incoming ma, 
shipment, gave the officers pi 
cause to believe that dangerous di 
evidence of its possession would be 
in the premises searched and in th 
cle searched." Conclusion of Law 
(Emphasis added.) 
"The search of the automobile wi 
justifiable under the automobile 
tion to the search warrant requin 
since there was both probable cau 
exigent circumstances. The fact th 
dence of dangerous drugs were fo 
the residence added to and enhaw 
probable cause had by the officers 
subsequent Carroll search of the a 
bile." Conclusion of Law No. 4. 
From these conclusions of law, it i 
the District Court, in making its deU 
tion of probable cause for the aean 
the residence and the car, looked 
the four corners of the search warr 
plication and was thereby in error, 
above conclusions, the District Court 
to evidence that John Stemple was a 
drug dealer and evidence of an infoi 
tip, neither of which were contained 
search warrant or the warrant's appl 
[12] Moreover, the District Cou 
liance upon the information receive 
the informant was error since the 
nothing in the record to satisfy t\ 
pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas (19 
U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 7 
Spinelli v. United States (1969), 3J 
410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 LEd.2d 637. 
was nothing in the record which 
"some of the underlying circum 
from which the informant conclud 
monu ©4i rAc irn , KliWKlfcK, 2d SERIES 
narcotics were where he claimed they 
i" and there was nothing in the record 
ring "the underlying circumstances 
i which the officer concluded that the 
mant . . . was 'credible' or his informa-
was 'reliable'." Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 
84 S.Ct. at 1514. See also, Leistiko, 578 
at 1163. 
ie District Court's determination of 
able cause must, therefore, be vacated, 
a new determination of probable cause 
be made by looking to the four cor-
of the search warrant application it-
I] It is well established in this state 
type of facts must be contained in a 
h warrant application: 
. . . Affidavits relied upon for the is-
ince of search warrants in both federal 
d state prosecutions must contain suffi-
nt facts to enable an impartial commis-
ner or magistrate to determine wheth-
probable cause exists under the Fourth 
nendment . . . '" State ex rel. Garris 
Wilson (1973), 162 Mont. 256, 511 P.2d 
17, quoting Application of Gray 
70), 155 Mont 510, 473 P.2d 532. 
>bable cause exists when the facts and 
mstances presented to the magistrate 
i warrant an honest belief in the mind 
reasonable and prudent man that the 
se has been, or is being, committed 
'that the property sought exists at the 
designated" See, State v. Robinette 
1978), 270 N.W.2d 573, 577. In other 
i, the search warrant application must 
i the underlying facts and circumstanc-
om which the magistrate can deter-
the validity of the affiant's conclusion 
certain evidence exists at a particular 
[set. Nathanson v. United States 
), 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 
see also, Aguilar, supra; United States 
ntresca (1965), 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 
13 L.Ed.2d 684; and Giordenello v. 
d States (1958), 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct 
2 L.Ed.2d 1503. 
re the facts given to the justice of the 
sufficient to indicate that marijuana 
ocated at the residence or in the car 
d in front of the residence? We think 
[14] Stemple's mere taking of an 
opaque green garbage bag out of a resi-
dence and the finding of a similar green 
garbage bag in an alley near the spot where 
the deputies lost sight of Stemple's truck 
were the facts presented to the justice of 
the peace. Such facts do not establish prob-
able cause for the search of the residence. 
The connection between the bag found in 
the alley and the residence is tenuous at 
best. 
[15,16] Likewise, the search warrant 
application fails to set out any underlying 
facts or circumstances that establish proba-
ble cause to search the car parked in front 
of the residence. The only reference to the 
car in the search warrant is: 
" . . . that the resident of the above de-
scribed duplex unit is the owner and was 
the driver of the described car when it 
arrived at the described residence early in 
the morning of January 11, 1980 and your 
affiant believes that said vehicle was 
used to convey the marijuana and other 
dangerous drugs to the residence describ-
ed..." (Emphasis added.) 
A mere affirmance of belief or suspicion by 
a police officer, absent any underlying facts 
or circumstances, does not establish proba-
ble cause for the issuance of a search war-
rant See, Application of Gray, supra, 473 
P.2d at 536; Nathanson, supra. 
Absent probable cause, the searches of 
the house and car were in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence re-
sulting from these searches is not admissi-
ble against the defendant Mapp v. Ohio 
(1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684,6 L.Ed.2d 
1081. 
Clearly, the introduction into evidence of 
the marijuana seized from the house and 
car constitutes reversible error since such 
evidence contributed to the conviction of 
the defendant. State v. Langan (1968), 151 
Mont. 558, 445 P.2d 565; State v. West 
(1980), Mont, 617 P.2d 1298, 37 St.Rep. 1772. 
Since no other evidence introduced at trial 
would support a conviction, a new trial can-
not be granted. 
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The judgment of the District Court is 
reversed and the cause dismissed. 
MORRISON, J., concurs. 
HASWELL, Chief Justice, concurring: 
I concur in the result. 
SHEEHY, Justice, concurring: 
I concur in the result. 
WEBER, Justice, dissents: 
I would hold that the defendant does not 
have standing to contest the search of his 
car and the objects inside the car. A re-
view of the search and seizure provisions of 
our code is enlightening. Section 46-5-101, 
MCA, describes the basis for a search and 
seizure and applies where a search is made 
incident to a lawful arrest, by the authority 
of a valid search warrant, under the author-
ity of a right of lawful inspection, and of 
particular import here, "with the consent of 
the accused . . . " Here, section 46-5-101 is 
not applicable in any way. Note that if the 
defendant had consented to the search of 
his automobile, the code section would have 
been applicable. Section 46-5-102, MCA, 
describes the manner in which a peace offi-
cer may search following a lawful arrest, 
and again, this section is not directly appli-
cable. Next, section 46-5-103, MCA, the 
section quoted in the majority opinion, pro-
vides in part: 
MNo search and seizure, whether with or 
without warrant shall be held to be ille-
gal as to a defendant if: 
"(1) the defendant has disclaimed any 
right to or interest in the . . . object 
searched or the instruments, articles, or 
things seized." (Underscoring added.) 
Section 46-5-103, MCA, is a codification of 
the rule established by this Court in State v. 
Nelson (1956), 130 Mont 466, 304 P.2d 1110. 
The Court affirmed the refusal of the Dis-
trict Court to suppress evidence seized in a 
search of an automobile without a search 
warrant, where the defendant Nelson had 
disclaimed any ownership or right to posses-
sion of the car or of any property taken 
therefrom. This Court quoted from an ear-
lier Montana case and stated: 
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"What was said by this court in State ex 
rel. Teague v. District Court [1925], 73 
Mont. 438, 441, 236 [P.] page 257, 258, 
rules this case so far as the motion to 
suppress is concerned. There this court 
said: 
" 'Although the acts of the officers in 
searching this tunnel and seizing the still 
and mash found in it may have been 
unlawful as to the possessors of the tun-
nel, since relator disclaimed the right of 
possession of both the tunnel and its con-
tents, he is not in a position to complain, 
as according to his own statements, he 
had no right in them and the acts of the 
officers therefore were not unlawful as to 
him. It is hardly necessary to cite au-
thorities to sustain this determination, 
but reference is made to Driskill v. UniU 
ed States, 8 Cir., 281 F. 146, and Keith v. 
Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 362, 247 S.W. 42. 
In each of which a like result was reached 
under analogous facts.' 
"This is the rule throughout the country, 
see annotations in 24 A.L.R., page 1425; 
32 A.L.R., page 415; 41 A.L.R., page 
1151; 52 A.L.R., page 487; 88 A.LR, 
page 365; et seq.; 134 A.L.R., page 831; 
150 AX.R, page 577." State v. Nelson, 
130 Mont at 471, 304 P.2d at 1113. 
This decision has not been overruled or 
modified. 
The same view is expressed in Elledge v. 
United States fcth Cir. 1966), 359 F.2d 404, 
in which the Court of Appeals denied the 
motion to suppress evidence, where, in re-
sponse to an officer's question as to what 
was in a package, the defendant had said, 
"I don't know. It's not mine." The court 
stated in part: 
"Such disclaimer of ownership by the ap-
pellant is analogous to abandonment Cf. 
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 
80 S.Ct 683, [698] 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (I960). 
In both cases the same message, by act or 
word, is delivered to the officer: that as 
to the actor or speaker there is no inter-
est which would be invaded by search or 
seizure. Lack of warrant does not under 
these circumstances render search or sei-
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zure unreasonable as to the actor or 
speaker." Elledge v. United States, 359 
F.2d at 405. 
In a similar manner, in Rakas v. Illinois 
(1978), 439 U.S. 128, 134, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 
58 L.Ed.2d 387, 395, the Court stated: 
"A person who is aggrieved by an illegal 
search and seizure only through the intro-
duction of damaging evidence secured by 
a search of a third person's premises or 
property has not had any of his Fourth 
Amendment rights infringed." (Under-
scoring added.) 
An extended discussion of cases with sim-
ilar holdings does not appear appropriate. 
We do note that Wayne LaFave, a leading 
authority on search and seizure, distin-
guishes between abandonment and dis-
claimer of ownership. LaFave takes the 
position that disclaimer of ownership should 
not be held tantamount to a waiver of 
Fourth Amendment protection, but notes 
that a number of courts have so held. W. 
LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure § 11.3 (1978, 
Supp.1981). 
Recent United States Supreme Court 
cases involving the question of standing to 
challenge the legality of searches, have em-
phasized the importance of a defendant's 
legitimate or reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the premises or objects searched. 
Rakas, supra; United States v. Salvucei 
(1980), 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 
L.Ed.2d 619; Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980), 
448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633. 
I am unable to see how the defendant could 
have had a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in opaque bags in the trunk of a car, 
when he had stated he did not own the car, 
he did not know who did own the car, and 
he did not know where the keys to the car's 
trunk were located. 
The unfortunate result of the majority 
opinion is that, once again, reliable evidence 
establishing a clear basis for conviction is 
suppressed. The majority's broad applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule has again ex-
acted a substantial social cost. As stated in 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137, 99 S.Ct. at 
427, 58 L.Ed.2d at 397: 
"Each time the exclusionary rule is ap-
plied it exacts a substantial social cost for 
the vindication of Fourth Amendment 
rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is 
kept from the trier of fact and the search 
for truth at trial is deflected. (Citations 
omitted)." 
I would hold that the District Court prop-
erly denied the defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence obtained from the search 
of the car. 
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Harry G. and Lillian MARTZ, husband 
and wife, et at, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
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BUTTE-SILVER BOW GOVERNMENT, 
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and Appellants. 
No. 81-237. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted Oct. 27, 1981. 
Decided Jan. 26, 1982. 
Rehearing Denied March 9, 1982. 
Property owners brought action 
against governmental unit and state chal-
lenging zoning ordinance. The District 
Court of the Second Judicial District, in and 
for the County of Silver Bow, Arnold Olsen, 
P. J., entered summary judgment for prop-
erty owners, and defendants appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Weber, J., held that: (1) 
ordinance was not enacted in violation of 
Montana laws governing zoning, and (2) 
evidence presented material question of 
fact as to whether ordinance unconstitu-
tionally excluded mobile homes and mobile 
home parks, thus, precluding summary 
judgment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Cite »», Mont. 
1. Zoning and Planning *»30 
Jurisdictional area referred to in statu-
tory sections indicating need for master 
plan for jurisdictional area is that of plan-
ning board. MCA 76-2-101 et seq., 76-2-
201. 
2. Zoning and Planning <*»30 
Where council of commissioners, in en-
acting zoning ordinance which covered the 
entire jurisdictional area of old city-county 
planning board, but no more, relied upon 
properly enacted comprehensive plan for 
entire jurisdictional area of planning board 
which developed that plan, ordinance was 
enacted in compliance with Montana law 
and did not conflict with statute limiting 
extension of municipal zoning to three miles 
beyond city limits of larger cities. MCA 
76-1-501 et seq., 76-1-505, 76-2-101 et 
seq., 76-2-201, 76-2-310(2). 
3. Judgment <*=> 181(15) 
In property owner's action against gov-
ernmental entity, and state of Montana, 
challenging zoning ordinance, material issue 
of fact existed as to whether ordinance had 
unconstitutionally exclusionary effect upon 
mobile homes and mobile home parks, thus, 
precluding summary judgment. 
Robert M. McCarthy argued, County 
Atty., Butte, for defendants and appellants. 
Cannon, Parish & Sheehy, Helena, Ross 
W. Cannon argued and Edmund F. Sheehy 
argued, Helena, for plaintiffs and respon-
dents. 
WEBER, Justice. 
Defendant appeals from summary judg-
ment in the District Court of Butte-Silver 
Bow in which Butte-Silver Bow Ordinance 
No. 53 was found to be (1) invalid because it 
was enacted in violation of Montana laws 
governing zoning, and (2) unconstitutionally 
exclusive because it restricted mobile homes 
and mobile home parks to an impermissibly 
small percentage of the area zoned. We 
vacate the summary judgment and remand 
to the District Court for further proceed-
ing*. 
M l P.2d42t 
The following issues are \ 
Court for review: 
(1) Did the District Court 
ing that Ordinance No. 53 i 
in accordance with Montani 
planning and zoning? 
(2) Did the District Cour 
Ordinance No. 53 unconstil 
of its exclusionary effect o 
and mobile home parks? 
(3) Did the District Cou 
granted plaintiffs' amend 
summary judgment? 
On March 14, 1972, the B 
City-County Planning Bo 
comprehensive master plan 
Butte and portions of Silv< 
The master plan covered th< 
tional area of that Planning 
accepted by both the city f 
the county government 
months. 
In May of 1977, the City c 
County of Silver Bow com 
single political entity know 
ver Bow/' the jurisdictiona 
was all of Silver Bow Couni 
erville. 
In August of 1978, the 
Butte-Silver Bow approved 
dinance No. 53, which ha 
mended to them in January 
old City-County Planning I 
the Zoning Commission. 0 
covered the entire jurisdicti 
old City-Planning Board, bi 
the time it was enacted, tl 
ment of Butte-Silver Bow ) 
board and no comprehensi 
total jurisdictional area. 
Ordinance No. 53 zones 
134.3 acres comprising the 
and land within four-and-oi 
the Butte city limits prior 1 
Ordinance No. 53 permits n 
private lots in areas zoned 
but permits mobile home p. 
eas zoned R-4. The minir 
areas zoned R-4S is one ac 
total area zoned is zoned 
